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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:
DID A POTENTIALLY USEFUL CONCEPT SINK IN THE “MUDDLE OF IDEAS”?
RAFAL HEJNE
Grand Valley State University
Budget cuts, budgets deficits, budget overruns, and limited budgets
constitute the reality of today’s public sector. This is not only a problem of
scarce resources for new investments but the public sector is also struggling
with maintaining assets and services at current levels. Therefore, public
managers try to look at alternative solutions which may provide answers to
present problems. Public-Private Partnerships seem to offer a good solution to
budget deficits and inefficient operations. The framework introduces private
sector resources and/or expertise as a partner in order to help, provide, and
deliver public sector assets and services. It bonds private and public sector for
the period of 20-30 years. Some say it is an excellent idea as it enables
investments which otherwise would be never procured and it does not strain
the budget. Others oppose it and say someday the bill will have to be paid off,
and it will turn out to be much more expensive than a traditional procurement.
Moreover, they say, it is a waste of taxpayers’ money as PPPs don’t bring
efficiencies and are done in favor of private partner. The dispute grows and
along with that the concept sinks in the muddle of ideas which often are false
statements. Therefore, there is a need to talk more about the PPP
arrangements and try to draw the true picture of it, in order to help public
manager obtain comprehensive knowledge which will facilitate decision
whether PPP should be conducted or not. The author of this paper looked at
the dispute, tried to refresh the concept of PPP, and give an objective
evaluation of it. It turned out to that it is hard to give one precise answer
whether PPPs are worthy of public attention. However, there are some useful
suggestions which can be drawn from the jumbled discussion.
INTRODUCTION
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) became a fashionable concept in the
discourse over the public sector’s need for services provision and its ability to
satisfy it with the traditional methods of procurement. There is a great pressure
on governments to reduce government spending and the public sector debt. On
the other hand, the needs are enormous and growing. However, raising taxes is
not a favorable option. Therefore, some local governments look for alternative
options. The City of Chicago undertook a competitive tender process to sell
the rights to manage, operate, maintain and collect tolls on the Skyway toll
road for a period of 99-years. This option was a better way to manage city
finances since raising property taxes was something the city would do only as
a last resort. This project set the new standards for the American transportation
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PPP market. In 1999, in the UK, a public tender took place for the largest
water and sewage PPP in this country. This project was the UK’s first water
project to be financed by the way of a bond issue, with a proportion of the cost
covered by a guaranteed bond issue and the balance met by a combination of
subordinated debt and equity provided by the sponsors.
The above examples are only a small indicator of the ongoing change
within the public procurement. The truth is that Public-Private Partnerships
take place across the globe. However, there is still a lack of understanding of
this framework or at least a muddle of information on that. Some parties,
usually governments and interested investors, believe the framework can solve
the problem of increasing budget constraints and the enormous need for
service provision within the public sector. Others, mostly labor unions,
criticize and oppose it. Therefore, there is still an anxiety toward using this
framework by the public sector. Public partners are afraid of arranging such
projects as they seem to be difficult and complex, especially in terms of
designing project finance. On the top of that, the ongoing dispute over PPPs
does not provide clear evidence of either success or failure of this framework.
On the other hand, the limited public budgets cannot handle new investments
or are struggling with maintain the current assets and services. If a country,
especially a developing one, wants to build up faster and improve the quality
of life for its citizens it has to opt for alternative solutions. Such a solution
might be PPPs.
This article helps to understand the PPP framework. It starts with a
presentation of background information about PPP arrangements and their
brief history. Subsequently, the author presents PPP definitions and structures.
It is followed by a presentation of different approaches toward PPP and the
ongoing evaluation of the framework. Finally, the author tries to come up with
an answer to the question of the usefulness of PPP arrangements.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Organizations, ranging from European Union to United Nation, not only
endorse the partnerships idea but also actively employ it. For many, following
the British lead, it focuses on attracting private financing for public projects. It
covers a range of business structures. In March 2003 European Commission
published guidelines for PPP in order to show how to combine private finance
with the UE funds. Beside that, the framework is used in New Zealand,
Canada and the USA and other countries. (Wettenhall, 2003)
English and Guthrie (2003) write that in Australia this framework
function under the name of Privately Financed Projects (PFP). In the UK the
framework is mostly known as Private Finance Initiative (PFI).
PPP is frequently viewed as a derivative of the privatization movement,
which fascinated conservative leaders in western liberal regimes on both sides
of the Atlantic through much of the 1980s. However, the US government used
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to apply partnerships as a key to coordinating federal initiatives in regional
economic development through the 1970s. In the UK, the Conservatives
introduced the Private Finance Initiative in the early 1990s as a form of PPP.
The active promotion of the idea started in 1997 since the labor government
came to power.
It is hard to decide whether the PPP is a sort of privatisation or
privatisation itself. Maybe it is a completely new concept. There are many
views on the topic. Wettenhall (2003) summarises some of them. He writes
that e.g. by Ryan (2001) partnership is seen as an advance on — almost an
alternative to — ‘contracting out and privatisation’. But others, like Chalmers
and Davis (2001) see it not as an alternative but rather as a feature of
contracting-out practice. Hess and Adams (2001) identify partnership as one of
several emerging policy tools. They emphasize that much of the rhetoric
remains confused, the result being ‘‘a muddle of ideas’’ in which ‘a
potentially useful concept is in danger of becoming just another public policy
reform fad’ (Hess and Adams, 2001, pp. 15). The National Council for Public
Private Partnerships in Canada (2002) simply calls it an umbrella term for all
activities which employ private resources for public sector needs. Figure 1
shows the most common believe that PPP falls somewhere between the
traditional procurement and the privatization.
Figure 1 PPP Structures

Source: PwC, 2004
In the UK PPPs are the key part of government’s strategy for delivering
modern, high quality public services and promoting country’s competitiveness.
British PPP market is the biggest in value. According to
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ report (2004) the capital value of closed deals in
2003 equaled $40bn, whereas the second, European (excluding the UK), PPP
market was worth $8bn. In both Americas it leveled at $2.5bn.
Definitely, the scheme is being used worldwide. Although there is not
one, common definition of PPP and not one particular structure which falls
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under PPP umbrella, there are some patterns which one can be observed. Let
us try to identify the most common ones.
PPP DEFINITION
Generally PPP projects are, or at least should be, driven by the public
sector - yet PPP still means different things to different countries. As it was
already mentioned in the above section (Figure 1), PPP can be viewed as a
variety of contractual structures that fill the space between the traditional ways
in which governments procured services and assets, and the full and permanent
transfer of assets and service provision that occurs under privatization. In the
UK PPP covers a range of business structures and partnership arrangements,
from PFI to joint ventures and concessions, to outsourcing, and to the sale of
equity stakes in state-owned businesses. Although widely used in Europe,
there is not one definition of PPP at the EU level.
European Commission’ Green Paper (2004) identifies some common
characteristics of the projects which fall under PPP frameworks. We can use
this approach to point out some basic features of those arrangements. In
general, the PPP term refers to forms of cooperation between public authorities
and the world of business which aim to ensure the funding, construction,
renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision
of a service. This cooperation is usually characterized by relatively long
duration of the relationship, majority of funds are provided by private sector,
public partner concentrates primarily on defining the objectives, which are
carried out by private partner, majority of risks, generally borne by the public
sector, are transferred to private partner.
European Investment Bank’s PPP definition seems to be a good summary
of all other ones (2004, p.2):
“Public-Private Partnership” is a generic term for
the relationships formed between the private sector
and public bodies often with the aim of introducing
private sector resources and/or expertise in order to
help, provide, and deliver public sector assets and
services. The term PPP is, thus, used to describe a
wide variety of working arrangements from loose,
informal and strategic partnerships, to design, build,
finance, and operate (DBFO) type service contracts
and formal joint venture companies.”
Just as there are many different definitions there are many ways the PPP
projects can be delivered. David Seader (2002), Co-Founder and Chairman of
the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships in the U.S., offers a
categorization of partnerships delivery options depending on the type of the
project: new projects, and existing facilities and service. Despite differences,

48

Hejne/Public-Private Partnerships

especially in the semantics, there are common delivery models which appear
across the globe and offer more or less the same structures. The most common
ones are presented below.
Build-Transfer/ Design-Build or Turnkey (US)
Build-Transfer (BT) or “turnkey” approaches involve the public sector
“ordering” a project and the private sector delivering it on site. Ownership of
the facility, in such arrangements, remains with the public sector. Therefore,
the private partner is sole responsible only for the design and construction.
Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT)
This technique is similar to the BT (DB) option, except that the facility is
passed on to the public sector under a lease structure upon completion and
acceptance of the facility. The public sector still operates the facility (during
the term of the lease).
Build-Transfer-Operate or Design-Build-Operate (US)
In the Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) model, the private sector designs
and builds a facility for the public sector, and usually provides the financing
for it. The title for the new facility is transferred to the government but the
contractor operates the facility and recovers its investment in the project over a
set number of years (usually 30).
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
Under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, the government turns
over development and initial operation to the private sector. Typically this
would be a public-sector role. The private sector contractor or consortium of
contractors finance the project, accomplish the construction, and operate the
new facility for some specified length of time after which it is expected to
transfer ownership to the government, usually at no cost.
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) or Build-Own-Operate (BOO)
In this case, the developer is much more like an owner. The eventual nocost transfer of the facility to the public sector would most likely be well after
the economic life of the facility has expired, or at least not until the financing
has been repaid.
The Build-Own-Operate (BOO) method involves the greatest degree of
private sector participation in development of a new facility. Under this model
the sponsoring consortium finances the project and operates the facilities as
the owner; it is not required to transfer the facilities back to the host
government.
Service Contract
The public sector retains the greatest degree of control over its services
and facilities when the private sector participates through a service contract. In
service contracting, or “contracting out,” the government contracts with
private entities to supply functional responsibilities that the governmental
previously performed, such as garbage pick up, billing and collection,
janitorial services, etc
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Management Contract
Like the service contract option discussed above, in a management
contract, a private partner operates a publicly owned facility under contract
with the sponsoring government. A management contract is broader than a
service contract since the private operator is responsible for all aspects of
operations and maintenance.
Lease
In a lease structure, the government grants a leasehold interest in some or
all of the assets (usually the entire existing system) with the requirement that
the private firm will operate and maintain them pursuant to a lease agreement.
The private firm charges the utility an agreed upon amount for providing the
service. Investments in new or expanded facilities would still be the
responsibility of the public owner of the assets, while the private lessee would
be responsible for repairs and rehabilitation as needed of the leased property.
Meter reading, revenue billing and collection may be contracted to the private
firm, but rate setting and responsibility for overall financial results would still
be the purview of the public owner.
Concession
With a concession, the government grants to a private partner the
exclusive rights to operate, maintain and manage the entire system for an
extended period of time. The basic system is still owned by the public sector,
but the private concessionaire owns all improvements and extensions. The
concessionaire sets the rates for the service under the regulatory requirements
of the government. The concession yields total operational responsibility to the
private consortium for the length of the concession without transferring or
selling the assets.
Partial/Full Divestiture
A partial or full divestiture involves sale of public infrastructure to the
private sector. Because the actual asset is transferred and government
permanently loses control, this option introduces private ownership and is very
similar to privatisation. A sale agreement will generally have certain
conditions set by the government in order to assure the new owner continues
to serve the citizens at the certain level.
The above presentation does not provide all possible options as the
scheme is being used worldwide and therefore has many different forms.
However, those seem to be the most common ones. PPPs are widely used as
they offer benefits to both side of the agreement. There is a strong support for
those projects, but also a lot of arguments are put against them. Let us have a
closer look at the dispute.
THE “MUDDLE OF IDEAS”
The UK government, the biggest supporter of PPP projects, defines (The
Government’s Approach, 2000) PPP (PFI) as it enables investments, which
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otherwise would not take place. It also advocates that the scheme offers value
for money. However, there is a strong dispute over the sensibility of using PFI,
especially among politicians. Maltby, IPPR’s Research Fellow on PPPs, says
that there are many ‘wild, unsubstantiated, or simply false claims about the
PFI’ (2002, 12th paragraph). More than anybody, trade unions oppose the idea.
Bettignies and Ross (2004) wrote that they oppose that PPP framework as they
are afraid that governments shift their work to private sector firms paying
lower wages and offering a poorer quality of service.
There is also a dispute in the scientific world. For the most part, scientists
and economists do not share with governments the huge enthusiasm for PPP.
Robinson (2000) argues the UK Treasury's strict fiscal rules could be easily
satisfied if the PFI was abolished. He claims that PFI could have been financed
through the public purse. Ball et al (2000) follows his argumentation and say
that PFI does not represent any additional investments. They study the matter
of PFI ‘being a good deal’ to the taxpayers. Bettignies and Ross (2004)
emphasize the concern of PPP being a way to hide the public debt. Grimshaw
et al. (2002, pp. 477) write ’the private sector partners… (are) winning
favorable terms’ in the contracts and therefore take advantage of the public
sector. Kelly (BBC News, 2001), research director at the Institute for Public
Policy Research in London, says that effectiveness of PFI depends on the
market sector, which it is applied to.
Because of the above presentation of such different outlooks, it becomes
crucial to find an answer to the question of whether the PPP is a good deal for
the public sector? One of the most common approaches is to research whether
PPP represents value for money. There are many arguments used by both the
allies and opponents of PFI. Through the analysis of most common arguments
one can try to provide an accurate picture of PPP.
PROS AND CONS
Allies of the PPP believe it is a good way to avoid ‘reckless government
borrowing’. They say it does not affect the sustainable investment rule1. This
might be achieved through significant risk transfer from public to private
sector (Stern, 2002).
Especially in the UK, the government is enthusiastic about the scheme.
This enthusiasm is supported by the constant government’s revision of the
projects. In 2004 British HM Treasury issued new guidance on assessing the
value for money of PFI/PPP deals. In 2005 the National Audit Office (NAO)
published its newest report on PPP (NAO, 2005). These analyses indicate that
PFI has been successful in delivering high quality facilities for public services.
1

The rule states that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held
over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level (usually below 40% of
GDP)
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Although, governments see some of the pitfalls they believes the PPP/PFI is a
very good deal for the taxpayers.
United Nations, one of the main supporters of the PFI, at the
organization’s website describe PPPs as they
“offer alternatives to full privatisation by
combining the social responsibility, environmental
awareness and public accountability of the public
sector, with the finance, technology, managerial
efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit of the private
sector”
The UK government expands this approach:
“Partnerships are delivering better quality public
services by bringing in new investment and
improved management, and are helping stateowned businesses achieve their full potential. …
[partnerships] help to deliver the high quality public
services this country deserves. Partnerships enable
the public sector to benefit from commercial
dynamism, innovation and efficiencies, harnessed
through the introduction of private sector investors
who contribute their own capital, skills and
experience. In this way, they provide better value
for money, which means that, within the resources
available, we can deliver more essential services
and to a higher standard than would otherwise have
been the case.” (The Government’s Approach,
2000, pp. 4)
Due to the fact that PPP became a commonly use political tool there is a
huge interest in the idea. It is believed to have advantages over traditional
procurement, including risk transfer, innovation and value for money (Ball at
al, 2003). However there are different results obtained from the evaluation of
the performance of the PPP projects. This activates the public opinion and the
discussion over the legitimacy of these statements.
British HM Treasury and the National Audit Office’s (NAO, 2003)
researches have provided the evidences of the very good performance of PFI
within the UK. HM Treasury reviewed a sample of 61 projects and the NAO
37 projects, out of a total of 450 PFI projects that were operational. NAO and
the HM Treasury report that:
• PFI projects are being delivered on time and on budget (88% coming in on
time or early, and with no cost overruns on construction borne by the public

52

Hejne/Public-Private Partnerships

sector) Previous research has shown that 70% of non-PFI projects were
delivered late and 73% ran over budget;
• The operational performance of the PFI has met with approval from public
sector clients
• In most projects (75%) the overall performance of the private sector partner
was matching up to expectations at the time of the contract close. Twenty
five percent said that the performance was “far surpassing” their
expectations.
• Eighty one percent of public bodies involved in PFI projects believed that
they are achieving satisfactory or better value for money from their PFI
contracts
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2002) was commissioned by the British
Office for Government Commerce to undertake a study of rates of return in
PFI projects out of concerns that the expected returns of the private sector
have been excessive. PwC looked at a range of 64 projects that reached
financial close between 1995 and 2001. It found that the average spread
between project internal rates of return (IRR) and the weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) was 2.4%. Karpova (2002) writes that cost savings to
national and local governments from PPP arrangements in the USA are
ranging between 20-25%. However, they vary from sector to sector.
In contradiction to governments, UNISON (2003), the largest trade union
in Britain, claims that PFI projects do not bring extra money, cost more, are
over budget and delivered late. Moreover, the union says that the design and
quality is poor and risk stay in the public sector. The Ontario Health
Coalition, a network of over 400 grassroots community organizations in
Canada, published in 2005 100 examples of domestic and international PPP
projects which show the evidence of cost overruns, delays, design and
construction flaws, quality problems, failed contracts, and service cuts
associated with the framework.
Maltby (2002, 12th paragraph) said:
“There are good reasons to use the PFI in some
circumstances. But instead of promoting potential
value for money benefits, or focussing on genuine
concerns, both Government and the Unions are
making wild, unsubstantiated, or simply false
claims about the PFI. It is time to end this PFI
fundamentalism.”
Bearing in mind Maltby’s statement one should look for objective sources
of information. Scientists, economists try to draw a true picture of PFI as they
try to objectively analyze the matter of the PFI being a good deal to public
sector. The way of financing, value for money, level and quality of
investments and innovation are the main concerns for the researchers. They try
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to find an answer; does the PFI really represent a better option than a
traditional procurement. Below the author briefly presents those researches.
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS?
Currie (BBC News, 2001) at City University in London says the level of
investment that would be required for some projects like building new schools
would start a fiscal crisis if it was funded with government money. ‘The PFI
is well worth it to bring in capital which otherwise might not be available’, he
says. ‘It's a framework to bring in money for services which otherwise might
be left to languish, such as schools’ (BBC News, 2001, 1st paragraph).
Kelly (BBC News, 2001, 2nd paragraph), says that using the policy as a
way of loosening the constraints on capital investment is a particularly bad
rationale for the scheme. ‘It's just an accounting device’, he says. Further he
articulates that ‘the government asks the private sector to put the money up
front and then pays it back through annual charges. The taxpayer still pays the
bill’. Furthermore, he points out, if this was the only rationale, the government
could borrow the money more cheaply on private capital markets on its own.
Robinson’s report (2000) argues the arguments of additional investments and
explains the accounting matters. He believes that if PFI had been put an end to
at the time of the Comprehensive Spending Review and the same capital
spending had been undertaken through conventional means, the sustainable
investment rule would have been satisfied, and by definition so would the
golden rule2. If PFI had been replaced by normal public sector spending, debt
to GDP ratio would still have fallen below the borderline. Investments could
have been done using money raised through conventional public borrowing
rather than through the PFI. Robinson claims that the Treasury's new fiscal
framework is entirely compatible with not having the PFI at all - the initiative
is not necessary to secure prudent public finances. For many, if not all, public
sector managers PFI is seen as the ‘only game in town’ and that the
conventional financing route is closed to them by Treasury fiat. Ball et al
(2000) agree with Robinson. The result of their research did not support an
argument of increased investments. In contradiction, the author of this paper in
his research, conducted in 2003, has found that the City of Newcastle upon
Tyne, in the UK, would never be able to fix and build schools for the city if
not the PFI.
VALUE FOR THE MONEY?
Although argument of additional investment is commonly used the most
important issue seems to be value for money (VFM). This issue was
researched by Ball et al (2000). Similarly Bettignies and Ross (2004),
2

The golden rule allows the government to borrow for investment, not to fund
current spending.
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describing the economics of PPP in Canada, investigated risk allocation,
efficiency and incentives, competition, economies of scale, public sector
borrowing and quality. They add the importance of labor relations issues to the
discussion.
The issue of value for money requires more attention. Everybody refers to
that while talking about PPPs. Gershon (2002, pp.1), the Chief Executive of
The Office of Government Commerce in the UK, emphasis a government
approach:
“PFI continues to play an important role for
meeting the long-term service delivery needs of the
government. PFI projects may enable departments
to be more efficient, …they may deliver services
directly to the public… Government remains
committed to PFI for both approaches because of
the opportunities it can offer for improved VFM.”
Does the use of the PFI allow better value for money? The answer to this
question is the most difficult one, as it is hard to define value for money. Ball
et al (2000), in their research, looked for the cost and forms of financing, the
bidding process, the importance of innovation, public sector comparator and
other efficiencies.
In relation to the cost and forms of financing they found two main
concerns. The first one was the cost of borrowing. Government is believed to
borrow at the lower rates than private sector. However, government counters
this argument. The consultants’ report, commissioned by the Treasury
Taskforce, (Treasury Taskforce Private Finance, 2000) considered this issue
and concluded that, although private finance may represent an additional cost,
it is not such a significant cost. Moreover, the private sector is able to deliver
savings in other aspects and therefore sustain better value for money. Ball et
al’s (2000) second concern was the way in which the projects are funded. PFI
projects are usually partly funded through equity (with a required rate of return
for shareholders), with the usual split being 90% debt and 10% equity,
although this can vary. Their findings suggest that equity funding in PFI
projects is declining. It amplifies risk distribution, with the public sector taking
on more risk. The advantage of this structure, however, is the lower cost of
finance – equity funding can be expensive, as the researchers investigated, the
average rates of return to equity holders was around 15%, but they even came
across the ones of 30%.
According to Ball et al (ibid.) the bidding process is undoubtedly more
expensive under PFI than with traditional methods for both public and private
sector partners. Generally, the cause for that is the use of external consultants
for legal, technical and financial advice. NAO (1999) estimates that the cost of
the bidding process under PFI can be in the region of £0.5 million to £2.5
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million ($0.96 million to $4.82 million). Others estimate that the bidding costs
to the private sector under PFI are seven times higher than under conventional
tendering, with total costs for all bidders reaching 3% of total project costs
(PwC, 2004). This is one reason why local authorities are being encouraged to
bundle together such projects. Ball et al (2000) suggest PFI is only suitable
for relatively large capital projects - £10 million minimum ($19.31 million).
However, this could be argued by the participants of the PPP Conference at
Warsaw in December 20043. Practitioners believe that PPP is available for all
projects (small as well).
INNOVATION?
Innovation is also very important in terms of the value for money
argument. PFI is believed to bring innovation to projects. Ball et al (2000)
reference to the government statement that:
“Private finance may, therefore, represent an
additional cost, but it is not such a significant cost
that value for money is inherently likely to be
imperilled, provided the private sector is able to
deliver savings in other aspects of the project.”
(Treasury Taskforce Private Finance, 2000, pp. 9)
Thus, the one of the major benefits of PFI is seen to be the opportunity for
innovation in terms of funding packages, delivery of services, and construction
of the asset. Innovation can lead to savings in terms of both construction costs
and operational costs.
Value for money is usually determined by the development of a Public
Sector Comparator, which involves a comparison of a PFI project to
traditional procurement. Ball at al (2000) and Wynne (2002) say that
sometimes there is no way to make the comparison, as PFI is the only option
for public clients. However, nowadays PSC is very often prepared or even
required by some countries regulations. (Industry Canada, 2003, Quiggin
2004)
OTHER EFFICIENCIES?
PFI may be driving other efficiencies in the public sector. Ball at al (2000)
try to see the issue of value for money and PFI in a wider context. They
believe that PFI drives other efficiencies in the public sector. Bettignies and
Ross (2004) name them. They say through partnership public sector gains
scare skills and complementarities. These arguments strongly oppose Unison
3

The author of this review was a participant and on the second day lead the
workshop on PPP foe local authorities. The conference took place 8-9
December, and was organized by MGG Conference.
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(2003) and Foot (2004) by saying it is an overstatement. Grimshaw et al.
(2002) studied in details two PFI projects. They said there might be some
gains within special categories. These were specialization, market discipline,
contract-performance discipline, private sector discipline and flexibility.
However, the results of their research were not in favor of PFI. They found
that the public sector partners tended to underestimate the time and resources
needed to negotiate and to mange the terms and conditions of the partnership
contract. They wrote (2002, pp. 502) that ‘this put the private sector partners
in the driving seat and enabled it to exploit its greater experience in working
to contract and winning favorable terms’.
RISK TRANSFER?
The valuation of risk is central to the value for money calculations of the
PSC. The Arthur Anderson Report (prepared for the Treasury Taskforce,
2000) estimates that savings of an average of 17% have been achieved in the
range of PFI projects they studied. However, the question arises how the risk
distribution differs under PFI from that of traditional procurement. Ball et al
(2000) explain in their work, the project cannot be counted as a PFI, unless the
sufficient risk is borne by the private sector, so that the asset appears on the
private rather than the public sector balance sheet. Bettignies and Ross (2004)
say that wise division of risk lead to better projects and make them successful.
However, the division is very hard and involves cooperation of both sides.
This brings us to the conclusion which, by looking at the above
discussion, is rather a challenging task. Mostly because of the lack of clear
evidence which one could base on the answer to the question of the usefulness
of PPP arrangements. Let us try to approach this task.
CONCLUSION
To summarize these ambiguous outlooks and research outcomes, one may
try to draw some general conclusions. Although the approaches to PPP
evaluation seem to be similar, there is not one precise answer whether PFI
offers a good deal to taxpayers. Simply by looking at the additionality and
VFM issues there is no consensus. There is a need to do more research and try
to evaluate PFI constantly as well as wait for the ‘entire outcome’ evaluation
in the future. Additionality and value for money are the most common
arguments used in the discussion. In order to provide some final statement one
could look at Ball et al (2000, pp. 106) research conclusion; ‘Whether PFI is a
good deal for the public purse depends essentially on individual projects being
certain of achieving vfm over the life of what can be very long-term contracts’.
Kelly (BBC News, 2001, 3rd paragraph) says that the argument of PFI projects
offering value for money is the most important. Private money brings better
management plus greater incentives to finish projects on time and within the
budget. However, he says, the policy has had mixed results. ‘From what we
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could tell it seems there is a strong reason for thinking the PFI is delivering
real value for money in some sectors like prisons and roads,…But in hospitals
and schools there's no evidence of significant gains, and in some cases there
have been significant losses.’ Thus, it is worthy looking for more research
within special sector in order to obtain better evaluation.
The author of this paper believes however, based on his personal research
and the evidence mentioned in the paper, that there are some conclusions
which one can be applied to any PPP arrangement in order to determine or
improve its value for money. The first one would be in line with Ball et al
(2000) conclusion that each project has to be evaluated separately. There are
some sectors, which has proved to be more successful then others. Therefore,
it is good to look at those experiences and transfer them to the sectors which
have obstacles in adopting PPP. Additionally, consulting should be used
wisely as it can drive the cost of the project up and make it too expensive. It is
a good practice to use governmental agencies or non-profit organizations, if
available, to facilitate the process with the proper expertise. Moreover, it is a
helpful to establish a shadow project in order to monitor if the public sector
would get a better deal if the project was done in a traditional way. Finally, the
smart risk allocation is crucial in each case. The public sector should retain
some risks in order to assure value for money. Pushing all risks to private
sectors drives the costs up and may not be the most efficient allocation of
potential risks. If the public and private partner follow those suggestions they
are more likely to obtain a successful agreement which will benefit both sides
in a short and long term. The bottom line here is that this relation is designed
to last at least 20-30 years. It is crucial to establish a solid foundation for it in
order to assure successful tenure.
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